Without Lend-Lease, the USSR would not have won

Lend-Lease indeed provided significant assistance to the Soviet Union, but it is incorrect to call it a decisive factor in victory. In food products, the United States supplied about 28% of meat, 24% of margarine and 29% of vegetable oil, but the share of flour, cereals and pasta did not exceed 4% of total production. Even in the most difficult year for agriculture, 1943, collective farms provided 94.2% of all grain procurements, completely covering the needs of the front and rear. Medicines accounted for less than 10% of Soviet production.

By technology, deliveries amounted to: up to 15% of aircraft, up to 10% of tanks, 17–30% of cars (depending on the calculation method), less than 5% of wagons and steam locomotives, up to 15% of aviation gasoline and less than 2% of gunpowder. At the same time, the USSR had its own significant pre-war reserves. Thus, Lend-Lease significantly accelerated the victory, but did not predetermine the outcome of the war. Its significance can neither be underestimated nor exaggerated. The very conclusion of the Lend-Lease agreement was a smart political step on the part of the Soviet leadership.